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OVERTIME PAY UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
PAUL H. SANDERS*
Any rate of pay exceeding the statutory minimum that the parties to an
employment agreement decide upon is permissible as far as the Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act 1 is concerned. In general, too, the mode of payment is
uncontrolled by the statute. Does this freedom of contract include the power
to make arrangements with respect to the agreed-upon compensation which will
be legally effective in determining liability under the statute? This question in-
dicates in broad scope the most persistent controversy centering around the term
"regular rate of pay," 2 .which, although undefined in the Act, is the required
basis-for the computation of statutory overtime payments. That such a contro-
versy on a matter of basic principle should continue to rage more than ten years
after the effective date of FLSA suggests the existence of either confusion in
court interpretations or dissatisfaction with such clear pronouncements as have
been made. It may be fairly said that, at times, each of these situations has ob-
tained. Dissatisfaction was the prevalent note after the United States Supreme
Court's action at the end of its last term in Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron,3
the case involving the New York longshoremen. As this is written, it remains
to be seen whether this will result in a general legislative modification of the
precisely-stated definitions set forth in that decision.
The Fair Labor Standards Act creates certain rights on the basis of in-
dividual rather than group activity. Coverage depends upon what a particular
individual employee dQes; extra compensation depends upon hours actually
worked by the individual employee. Under the general requirements of the
Act now prevailing, individual employees engaged in interstate commerce, or
in the production of goods for such commerce, are to receive not less than 40
cents per hour 4 and one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours
worked in excess of 40 per week.5 The latter provision is designated in the
Act as one for "maximum hours," although it imposes no absolute limitation.
It is, of course, the basis for the "overtime pay" or "time and one-half," which
constitutes the Act's major significance under prevailing economic circum-
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University
.1. 52 STAT. 1063 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 201-219 (1947)-hereafter referred to
as FLSA and by section numbers (1 through 19) of the original Act. ,
2. § 7(a), 29 U. S. C. A. § 207(a) (1947). See Note, 47 COL. L. REv. 1189 (1947);.
35 CALIF. L. REv. 589 (1947); 45 MIcH. L. REv. 1053 (1947); 31 MINN. L. Rav. 745
(1947).
3. 334 U. S. 446, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186, 92 L. Ed.-(1948) ; Note, 16 U. OF CHI. L. REv.




stances. The requirement is applicable only to work for a single employer
within a workweek of seven consecutive days. There are two major problems
involved in the computation of the excess compensation required by the Act
for a particular employee in a designated week: (1) How many hours has he
worked in the .workweek? (2) What is his regular rate of pay? Deceptively
simple in statement, these questions have nevertheless required the considera-
tion of courts in literally hundreds of instances.
More than a dozen cases on the two aspects of overtime have been de-
cided by the United States Supreme Court.6 Each of the Court's major pro-
nouncements on the legal principles controlling the answers to the above
questions has provoked nationwide comment, much of it unfavorable in charac-
ter. The answer to the "hours worked" problem in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co.5 resulted in the major legislative changes of the Portal-to-Portal
Act of 1947.s This aspect of the overtime question is not within the scope of
this discussion. As previously indicated, the longshoremen case, Bay Ridge
Operating Co. v. Aaron, 9 decided in June 1948, defined "regular rate of pay"
with some precision. However, the decision was vigorously protested by the
United States, as well as by the union affected and by management interests,lo
and was announced widely as requiring employers to pay "overtime on over-
time." 11 It appears probable that Congress during the present session will
amend the Act to change the effect of this decision at least so far as the long-
shore, stevedore, and building and construction industries are concerned. 12
It is the purpose of this article to examine the regular-rate-of-pay problem
in light of the Bay Ridge decision and its predecessors; to note the continued,
though limited, vitality of a major exception to the Supreme Court's normal
"calculating-machine" approach to the determination of the "regular rate";
to ascertain what types of premium-pay arrangement are "overtime premiums"
to be credited against an employer's liability under the Fair Labor Standards
Act; to consider, in addition, what elements of compensation must be treated
as entering into the total figure, which when divided by the number of hours
worked in a week will yield the regular rate of pay of the individual employee.
Finally, a brief consideration will be given to possible legislative changes af-
fecting the rate of pay for overtime computation.
6. See Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-1945, 59 HAIW.
L. R v. 321, 350 et seq. (1946).
7. 328 U. S. 680, 66 Sup. Ct. 1187, 90 L. Ed. 1515 (1946).
8. 61 STAT. 84 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 251 et seq. (Supp. 1948).
9. 334 U. S. 446, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186 (1948).
10. See interests represented by counsel in the denial of the petition for rehearing,
69 Sup. Ct. 10 (1948).
11. Farmer, Overtime on Overtime: The Supreme Court Decision in the Bay Ridge
Case, 34 VA. L. REv. 745 (1948) ; Overtime "on Overtime Problcmns under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 10 N. A. M. L. Di. 45 (1948).
12. See infra n. 139
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DEFINING "REGULAR RATE OF PAY"
If the agreed total compensation consists of nothing except a designated
hourly rate for each hour worked or a fixed weekly salary 13 for a fixed number
of hours in the workweek, then no problem arises concerning the "regular
rate." Virtually every other pay arrangement, however, will present trouble-
some questions concerning the application of the overtime requirements of
FLSA. The decisions of the Supreme Court have now supplied answers to
the most important of these. In seven cases prior to the Bay Ridge case the
Supreme Court had found it necessary to pass upon the meafling of "regular
rate of pay." 14 In five instances the Court had rejected efforts to define the
term by individual or collectively-bargained contracts designed to avoid or
minimize any requirement for a 505% increase in the employer's wage bill for
each hour worked in excess of 40 by an individual employee. In Walling v.
A. H. Belo Corp.15 and Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.,1 the
Court sustained the contracted-for "regular rate of pay" as supplying the basis
for compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act. This resulted in spite of
the fact that in many weeks a much higher rate was actually received under a
guaranteed weekly salary providing compensation for both straight time and
overtime through hours much in excess 'of 40. The doctrine of these two
cases has not been overruled by the Bay Ridge decision. However, it appears
to be fundamentally inconsistent with the principles announced in the latter
decision and with the philosophy of its majority opinion as well as that of the
other five cases referred to above.
There are thirteen terms defined in the Definition Section 17 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.. Other sections permit the Administrator to define cer-
tain terms, these definitions having the force and effect of law subject to the
normal restrictions on administrative action.' s Nowhere, however, is there a
definition or provision for a definition of "regular rate of pay." The legislative
history of the Act seems to be uninformative in this regard.19 Highlighting
13. See Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 580, 62 Sup.
Ct. 1216, 86 L. Ed. 1682 (1942); accord, Kreeft v. Bates Piece Dye Works, Inc., 150 F.
2d 818 (C. C. A. 2d 1945); cf. Landreth v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., 147 F. 2d 446
(C. C. A. 8th 1945); Harrington v. Empire Construction Co., 71 F. Supp. 324 (D. Md.
1947); McCloskey & Co. v. Dickinson, 56 A. 2d 442 (D. C. Mun. Ct. App. 1947).
14. Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 62 Sup. Ct. 1216,
86 L. Ed. 1682 (1942) ; Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 'U. S. 624, 62 Sup. Ct. 1223,
86 L. Ed. 1716 (1942); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U. S. 37, 65 Sup. Ct. 11,
89 L. Ed. 29 (1944); Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U. S. 419,
65 Sup. Ct. 1242, 89 L. Ed. 1705 (1945) ; Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U. S. 427,
65 Sup. Ct. 1246, 89 L. Ed. 1711 (1945); Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.,
331 U. S. 17, 67 Sup. Ct. 1056, 91 L. Ed. 1312 (1947); 149 Madison Avenue Corp. v.
Asselta, 331 U. S. 199, 67 Sup. Ct. 1178, 91 L. Ed. 1432 (1947); cf. United States v.
Rosenwasser, 323 U. S. 360, 65 Sup. Ct. 295, 89 L. Ed. 301 (1945).
15. 316 U. S. 624, 62 Sup. Ct. 1223, 86 L. Ed. 1716 (1942).
16. 331 U. S. 17, 67 Sup. Ct. 1056, 91 L. Ed. 1312 (1947).
17. § 3.
18. E.g., §§ 7(c), 13(a), 14.




the controversy referred to in the opening paragraph, majority opinions of the
Supreme Court have stated directly contradictory conclusions as to the in-
ference to be drawn from the failure of Congress to define the term. In the
Belo decision, Mr. Justice Byrnes said: 20
"Presumably, Congress refrained from attempting such a definition because the
employment relationships to which the Act would apply were so various and unpredict-
able. And that which it was unwise for Congress to do, this Court should not do.
When employers and employees have agreed upon an arrangement which has proven
mutually satisfactory, we should not upset it ......
In the Bay Ridge decision, Mr. Justice Reed speaks for the Court much as he
had spoken in dissent in Belo :21
"As Congress left the regular rate of pay undefined, we feel sure the purpose
was to require judicial determination as to whether in fact an employee receives the
full statutory excess compensation, rather than to impose a rule that in the absence
of fraud or clear evasion employers and employees might fix a regular rate without
regard to hours worked or sums actually received as pay."
The courts have had to rely on the asserted purposes of the Act and its
time-and-one-half section [7(a)] in defining what Congress left undefined.
The importance of the purposes of the Act in this determination can best be
understood by examining some of the lower court opinions in the days prior
to a Supreme Court decision dealing specifically with regular rate of pay. At
that time considerable controversy existed as to whether the Fair Labor
Standards Act required anything more for hours worked in excess of 40 than
one and one-half times the minimum hourly rate required by Section 6. There
were court decisions sustaining each position in this argument.2 2 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion in the Belo case 23 took the position
that no more than time and one-half on the minimum rate was required and
asserted that it was not the purpose of the Act to discourage or limit overtime.
Rather both the wage and hour provisions were said to be part of a scheme
to raise substandard wages. In contrast the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Missel v. Overnight Motor Transportation Co., Inc.,2 4 noted the diversity
of approach to the problem based on assumed Congressional intent, and decided,
on the basis of the Act's legislative history, that it was intended to protect
20. Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624, 634, 62 Sup. Ct. 1223, 86 L. Ed.
1716 (1942).
21. 334 U. S. 446, 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
22. Compare Bumpus v. Continental Baking Co., 124 F. 2d 549 (C. C. A. 6th 1941);
Missel v. Overnight Motor Transportation Co., Inc., 126 F. 2d 98 (C. C. A. 4th 1942);
Graves v. Armstrong Creamery Co., 154 Kan. 365, 118 P. 2d 613 (1941); Thornberg
v. E. T. & W. N. C. Motor Transportation Co., 178 Tenn. 298, 157 S. W. 2d 823 (1940) ;
Tidewater Optical Co., Inc. v. Wittkamp, 179 Va. 545, 19 S. E. 2d 897 (1942), with
Fleming v. A. H. Belo Corp., 121 F. 2d 207 (C. C. A. 5th 1941); Floyd v. DuBois
Soap Co., 139 Ohio St. 520, 41 N. E. 2d 393 (1942), rezd i'em., 317 U. S. 596 (1942).
23. Fleming v. A. H. Belo Corp., 121 F. 2d 207 (C. C. A. 5th 1941).
24. 126 F. 2d 98 (C. C. A. 4th 1942).
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against and compensate for long hours, as well as relieve unemployment by
penalizing the employer who works an individual employee longer than 40
hours a week.
The Fourth Circuit decision in the Missel case assumed that it was re-
pudiating and refusing to follow the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in the Belo case.
Paradoxically, in its first interpretative consideration of FLSA overtime pay,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed both decisions 25 on the same day
and thereby set the stage for much of the ensuing confusion and misunder-
standing. The Supreme Court opinion in the Missel case required that a flat
weekly salary be divided by the number of hours actually worked to get the
"regular rate" where a fluctuating workweek was worked and the salary was
said to cover straight and overtime pay. More significantly, however, the
'Court affirmed not only the result but the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit on
the matter of legislative purpose. The legislative history was said to indicate
that Congress intended by Section 7(a) "to require extra pay for overtime
work by those covered by tfle Act even though their hourly wages exceeded
the statutory minimum." 26 The dual purposes of the overtime provisions of
,the Act, the Court found, are (1) compensation to individuals required to work
in excess of the statutory hours and (2) prevention of overtime, with a con-
sequent spreading of employment, by penalizing the employer who works an
individual employee for more hours than the statutory maximum. In neither
the Belo nor Halliburton decisions is there any attempt to square the results
with these asserted purposes of Congress. The Supreme Court has continued,
with the one exception indicated, to reiterate these dual purposes in consider-
ing subsequent contracts for "regular rate of pay." It is obvious that a ma-
jority of the Court feels that the decision in the Bay Ridge case 27 follows
necessarily from the construction of the Act in light of these purposes and the
individual character of the rights created under the Act. As a matter of fact,
there seems no serious reason to doubt the intention of Congress to regulate
hours, as well as provide for minimum wages. Quite apart from extrinsic aids,
the statute in speaking of "maximum hours" and "maximum workweek" 28
must be taken to intend what those words would normally import as modified
by the specific section covering that subject matter. In addition, significance
attaches to the exemption from the overtime provision provided under Section
7(b) (1) and 7(b) (2) for certain collective bargaining contracts which have
absolute maximum hour limitations for work within 26 or 52 consecutive
weeks.
25. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 62 Sup. Ct. 1216, 86 L.
Ed. 1682 (1942); Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624, 62 Sup. Ct. 1223, 86 L.
Ed. 1716 (1942).
26. 316 U. S. at 577.




If hours are to be controlled by FLSA, what is the legal situation when a
compensation arrangement fails to control or compensate for the hours of a
particular employee? If, in order to compensate the individual employee af-
fected and to deter the employer from working employees individually for more
than 40 hours a week, the Act requires 50% increase in compensation to the
employee (or 50% increase in labor costs from standpoint of the employer),
can a contract, individually or collectively-bargained, by its designation of
"regular rate of pay" or "overtime" or even "rate intended to be the sole basis
of extra compensation required by the Fair Labor Standards Act" or "premium
pay to be offset against statutory requirements under the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act," change what the Act might otherwise require? These questions
present more specific aspects of the broader topic of controversy suggested in
the opening paragraph. Outside of the Belo-Halliburton doctrine, the Court
has consistently refused to permit the determination of regular rate of pay to
be governed by formal contract statement. The words "regular rate of pay"
it has said, "obviously mean the hourly rate actually paid for the normal, non-
overtime workweek." 29
'In its first case on the topic after the Belo and Missel cases the Court be-
gan the process of distinguishing Belo and following Missel. In Walling v.
Helnerich & Payne,30 a contract which divided each daily tour of duty in
half, and comnpensated hours in the first half at a "base or regular rate of pay"
and designated hours in the second half of the tour as "overtime" compensable
at one and one-half times the "regular rate" was said to provide for a
"fictitious" and "illusionary" rate. Computation of the regular rate for purpose
of FLSA requirements would be achieved, the Court said, by "the simple proc-
ess of dividing the wages received for each tour by the number of hours in that
tour." 31 The vice of the plan, the Court said, lay in the fact that "the contract
regular rate did not represent the rate which was actually paid for ordinary,
non-overtime hours, nor did it allow extra compensation to be paid for true
overtime hours." 32 In two decisions handed down in June 1945 the Court
made even stronger proclamations of this same approach to the method of
determining the regular rate of compensation. In Walling v. Youngcrinan-
Reynolds Hardwood Co., 33 it was dealing with a case where time and one-
half was supposed to be paid on a designated hourly "regular rate," but not
on piece-work earnings, which averaged more than 50% above the stated
hourly rate and which for virtually all the employees represented the only
earnings received. The Court said:
29. Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U. S. 37, 40, 65 Sup. Ct. 11, 89 L. Ed. 29
(1944).
30. 323 U. S. 37, 65 Sup. Ct. 11, 89 L. Ed. 29 (1944).
31. 323 U. S. at 40.
32. Id. at 41.
33. 325 U. S. 419, 65 Sup. Ct. 1242, 89 L. Ed. 1705 (1945).
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"The regular rate by its very nature must reflect all payments which the parties
have agreed shall be received regularly during the workweek, exclusive of overtime
payments. It is not an arbitrary label chosen by the parties; it is an actual fact. Once
the parties have decided upon the amount of wages and the mode of payment the
determination of the regular rate becomes a matter of mathematical computation, the
result of which is unaffected by any designation of a contrary 'regular rate' in the
wage contracts." "'
The companion case of Walling v. Harnischfeger Corporation 35 involved
the compensation of employees, who, under a collective bargaining agreement,
were to receive the higher of designated basic hourly rates or designated job
rates (calculated in terms of assumed standard performance time). For hours
in excess of 40 per week the employees received a premium equal to 50%
of the basic hourly rate. The "incentive bonus," if any, due under the job rates
might not be calculated until perhaps weeks or months later. The collective-
bargaining agreement specifically provided: "the parties agree that, for all
purposes, the regular rate of pay at which each employee who participates
in an incentive plan is employed is the base rate of each such employee."
Payment of time and one-half on the "base rate" would constitute a real
penalty to the employer for working the employee more than 40 hours in
the week, but the penalty would be less than 50%. The Court rejected the
agreement as determinative of compliance with the statutory requirements
and said:
"No contract designation of the base rate as the 'regular rate' can negative the
fact that these employees do in fact regularly receive the higher rate. To compute
overtime compensation from the lower and unreceived rate is not only unrealistic but
is destructive of the legislative intent. A full 50% increase in labor costs and a full
50% wage premium, which were meant to flow from the operation of Section 7(a),
are impossible of achievement under such a computation."
Mr. Chief justice Stone, dissenting in these two cases, stated that the
approach of the majority was in flat contradiction to the Belo decision, which
had permitted the designation by contract of an hourly regular rate of pay
and of a guaranteed weekly salary providing compensation for both regular
time and overtime up to more than 50 hours per week. Certain lower courts
were inclined to agree with him that the Court had virtually abandoned the
Belo approach.3 7 The doctrine, however, survived as a "narrow precedent'
through the Halliburton as decision in 1947. Its present significance is dis-
cussed in a later section.3 9 Shortly after Halliburton. the Court rejected a
34. 325 U. S. at 424, 425.
35. 325 U. S. 427, 65 Sup. Ct. 1246, 89 L. Ed. 1711 (1945).
36. 325 U. S. it 430.
37. See Walling v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 151 F. 2d 381 (C. C. A. 7th 1945);
Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., Inc., 154 F. 2d 780, 784 n. 4 (C. C. A. 2d
1946), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 870 (1946).
38. Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 331 U. S. 17, 67 Sup. Ct. 1056,
91 L. Ed. 1312 (1947).
39. See infra p. 391.
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collectively-bargained formula for determining the regular rate of pay of
individual employees and the application of the formula without regard to the
actual hours worked by the employees in 149 Madison Avenue Corporation
v. Asselta.40 In this case the Court returned to the theme that the crucial
question is whether the rate derived from the formula is "in fact" the regular
rate within the statutory meaning.
In light of the foregoing series of pronouncements, at least, it should
have occasioned little surprise that in 1948 the Court in the Bay Ridge case
should set forth the following definition as applicable to each individual
employee:
"Regular rate of pay.-Total compensation for hours worked during any work-
week less overtime premium divided by total number of hours worked." 1"
In other words, all the elements of compensation which the parties have
agreed shall be paid for work done, no matter when or in what form the
payments are made, except those extra payments for work because the
individual has worked previously a specified number of hours in the day or
week,42 are to be added together and divided by the number of hours actually
worked to arrive at the "regular rate" of the individual. By applying the
above definition in the Bay Ridge case involving certain longshoremen who
in some instances had worked nothing but time designated by their union
contract as "overtime," the majority of the Court was accused by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, in dissent, of needlessly sapping the principle of collective
bargaining, of treating the words of the FLSA "as though they were parts
of a crossword puzzle," and of applying that Act "in disregard of industrial
realities." 43 A more detailed study of this latest decision and its factual
background would seem in order.
THE Bay Ridge CASE
The plaintiffs in the two cases involved in this decision were longshore-
men, working in the Port of New York under a collective bargaining
agreement between the International Longshoremen's Association and the
New York Shipping Association together with certain steamship and steve-
dore companies. The collective bargaining agreement established a basic
workday of 8 hours and basic workweek of 44 hours. "Straight time" rates,
varying with the type of cargo handled, were applicable for work performed
from 8 A.M. to 12 Noon and from 1 P.M. to 5 P.M., Monday to Friday,
inclusive, and from 8 A.M. to 12 Noon Saturday. "Overtime" rates (150%
40. 331 U. S. 199, 67 Sup. Ct. 1178, 91 L. Ed. 1432 (1947).
41. 334 U. S. 446, 450 n. 3, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
42. Ibid.
43. 334 U. S. 446, 477-478, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
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of "straight time," or approximately that percentage) were paid for work
at all other times, including meal hours and legal holidays. No differential
for work in excess of 40 hours per week was provided under the contract,
the general features of which had been maintained since 1916. The plaintiffs
claimed that their regular rate of pay for the purposes of Section 7(a) of
the FLSA was the average hourly rate computed by dividing the total
compensation received pursuant to the agreement in any workweek from
any single employer by the total number of hours worked for that particular
employer in that week. The defendant stevedoring companies claimed that
the "straight time" rates of the agreement constituted the regula rate of
pay of each employee, regardless -of when he worked. It followed that, if the
employee had been compensated for as many or more "contract overtime"
hours as the number of hours he had worked in excess of 40 in a week, there
did not exist any liability for statutory excess compensation under FLSA.
The contract was treated by the courts passing on it as being expressly
intended by the parties to designate the "straight time" rate as the "regular
rate of pay." Since the stevedoring companies operated under cost-plus
contracts for the wartime operations involved, the United States was the
real party in interest. Officials of the union of which the plaintiffs were
members vigorously opposed their claim. The District Court held that the
contract straight-time rates constituted regular rates of pay for FLSA
purposes.44 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
otherwise.
45
The Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion reached by the Circuit
Court of Appeals. It reverted to the purposes of the Act to compensate
individual employees working hours in excess of the statutory maximum
and to spread employment through inducing employers to shorten hours
because of the pressure of extra cost. The Act affords protection to each
individual employee from overly long hours, the Court says: "So although
only one of a thousand works more than forty hours, that one is entitled
to statutory excess compensation." 46 It becomes necessary, therefore, to
determine for each individual plaintiff his regular rate of pay.
In arriving at its definition of "regular rate of pay" the Court reviews
the terminology as developed from the Missel case 47 through the Asselta
case 48 as discussed above, The Belo-4 9 Halliburton 50 exception, providing
by contract for a guaranteed weekly wage as well as a regular rate of pay,
44. Sub norn. Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 69 F. Supp. 956 (S. D. N. Y.
1947).
45. 162 F. 2d 665 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
46. 334 U. S. 446, 460, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
47. Supra note 25.
48. Srepra note 40.
49. Supra note 15.
50. Supra note 16.
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is inapplicable, the Court.states. It must, in any event, be regarded as a
"narrow precedent" covering its particular factual situation and does not
mean that "mere words in a contract can fix a regular rate." 51 The Court
rejects the argument that a collective bargaining agreement purporting to
establish a regular rate of pay for individual employees can have any special
validity when it is demonstrated not to be an accurate portrayal of the true
compensation received. Nothing in FLSA, the Court says, authorizes giving
decisive weight to contract declarations as to regular rate because they are
the result of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining contracts had been
.held legally insufficient in both the Harnischfeger 52 and Asselta 53 cases. The
Court states its conclusion
"... that Congress intended the regular rate of pay to be found by dividing the
weekly compensation by the hours worked unless the compensation paid to the
employee contains some amount that represents an overtime premium. If such overtime
premium is included in the weekly pay check that must be deducted before the
division." "'
The Court specifically disavows any allowance for "overtime on overtime"
in the following language:
"When the statute says that the employee shall receive for his excess hours one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed, it is clear to us that
Congress intended to exclude overtime premium payments from the computation of
the regular rate of pay. To permit overtime premiums to enter into the computation
of the regular rate would be to allow overtime premium on overtime premium-a
pyramiding that Congress could not have intended. In order to avoid a similar double
payment, we think that any overtime premium paid, even if for work during the first
forty hours of the workweek, may be credited against any obligation to pay statutory
excess compensation." "
The Court then turns to the definition of "overtime premium" and
concludes that "it is that extra pay for work because of previous work for a
specified number of hours in the workweek or workday." 56 This is because
such extra pay, whether required by statute or contract, serves the same
basic purposes as the Fair Labor Standards Act itself. Higher pay for work
on a less desirable shift, or for a disagreeable or dangerous job or because
of the day of the week, or for work on a holiday, does not fit the definition.
"The higher rate must be paid because of the hours previously worked for
the extra pay to be an overtime premium." 57 In this case, the Court said,
the size of the differential paid for night and other work outside of the
prescribed standard workweek did not change the fact that large wages were
51. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U. S. 446, 462, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186 (1948).
52. Supra note 35.
53. Supra note 40.
54. 334 U. S. 446, 464, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
55. Ibid.
56. Id. at 465.
57. Id. at 466.
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paid for work in undesirable hours and not because of having worked previous
hours. Charts showing concentration of work in the straight time hours are
of no significance in determining the regular rate of pay of individual, work-
men. "As a matter of fact," the Court says, "regular working hours under a
contract, even for an, individual, has no significance in determining the rate
of pay under the statute. It is not important whether pay is earned for work
outside of regular working hours. The time when work is done does not
control whether or not all or a part of the pay for that work is to be considered
as a part of the regular pay." 5s8 As the employment contract was one for
irregular hours, the rule of dividing the weekly wage by the number of
hours worked to find the regular rate of pay was found to be applhcable.
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter dwells on the dislo-
cating effect that the Court's decision will have on premium-pay arrangements
under collective bargaining contracts in general and in the longshoring
industry in particular. He points out the casual nature of the employment
in that industry and the fact that employees do not usually work continuously
for one employer. In light of these pecularities, he asserts the collective
bargaining agreement involved in this decision was the only effective way
to deter a long workweek. "The 'regular rate' in a given industry must be
interpreted in the light of the customs and practices of that industry." 59 It
was competent for the parties to a labor agreement to establish a "regular
rate," provided only that the rate so established "truly reflects the nature of
the agreement and is not a subterfuge to circumvent the policy of the
statute." 60 His reasoning may be paraphrased thus: Here the employees
are represented by a strong union, the parties have dealt at arm's length,
and the defined "regular rate" is not an artifice for circumventing the
commands of the law. In fact, the contractual arrangements, designed to dis-
courage overwork and underemployment, were established in their general
features more than twenty years before the effective date of FLSA. The
"overtime" provided by the contract is clearly distinguishable from a shift
differential. He concludes that the "regular rate" was the "straight time"
scale provided by the union contract and that this was true for the whole
union including the individual plaintiffs. "To call their demand one for
'overtime pyramided on overtime' is not to use a clever catchphrase, but to
describe fairly the true nature of their claim." 61
It will be seen that the Court, by its rigorous, arithmetical formula has
disturbed an established relationship by doing that which neither party to
a collective agreement desired. Likewise, it has made clear the probable
existence of considerable liability for excess statutory compensation in the
58. Id. at 473.
59. Id. at 482.
60. Ibid.
61. Id. at 495.
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industry directly affected and others, and required an approach to premium-
pay arrangements that may prove quite distressing in ensuing collective
bargaining negotiations. If, for example, an employer must average in with
the other pay of an employee the double pay for work on a holiday, in
computing a base for statutory overtime, and receive no credit toward statu-
tory overtime from such payment, he may be very reluctant to continue any
such holiday pay provision in his union contract. Similarly, the requirement
would be a deterring factor, if the original inclusion of such a contract provi-
sion were under consideration. These features of the decision are undoubtedly
disturbing. The peculiarities of longshoring, in which an individual frequently
works for several different employers in the course of the week, the urgent
wartime conditions under which the work in question was performed, the
large governmental liability involved, the extraordinary size of the premiums
for night and other "non-standard" work (which hindsight would say cer-
tainly should not have been permitted to be effective during the war
emergency)-all these factors appeal for a decision limiting the plaintiffs
to no more than permitted by the collective agreement under which they
had worked.
If the decision in Bay Ridge had been different, however, the Court would
have accorded validity for FLSA purposes to a contract designation of
"straight" and "overtime" bearing no necessary relationship to the actual
facts in the case of a particular employee. Much as it may have tried it would
fhave been difficult, if not impossible, to restrict the scope of the precedent
to the peculiar facts of the longshore case. Experience after the Belo decision
indicated caution in this regard. It might very well be assumed that it was
this "consciousness of precedent," 62 which prevented a majority acceptance
of the dissenting point of view as to the disposition of the case. If the Court
had announced such a decision, would it have let the country in for another
period of contract-making such as ensued from the Belo decision (in many
instances unrelated to the special facts of that decision)? Could the Court
have possibly drawn a line between "individual" and "collective-bargaining"
.contracts in this connection without causing a storm of criticism? Could it
have made the strength and independence of the contracting union criteria
in judging the validity of "regular" and "overtime" rate set by contracts?
-Could it have made "good faith" and a "fair bargain" elements of such contrac-
tual validity? Would it have been feasible to judge an "overtime premium"
on the basis of size, regularity of receipt, or any purpose other than extra
pay for having previously worked specified hours? Could the courts administer
a rule which permits "regular" and "overtime" rates to be set by contract,
overriding actual pay arrangements for particular individuals, provided that
62. See Mr. Justice Reed's dissent in Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624,
635, 62 Sup. Ct. 1223, 86 L. Ed. 1716 (1942).
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the whole arrangement is not "an artifice for circumventing the plain com-
mands of the law" without provoking continuing litigation? Could the Court
have abandoned the individual basis upon which the rights in the Act are
established and written an exemption for the peculiar facts of longshoring
without indulging in judicial legislation to an extreme degree? Consideration
had to be given to long-run effects on the great bulk of those to whom the
law was of importance, considering the essential features and stated purposes
of FLSA. It may be asked fairly whether these purposes are more likely to
be achieved by adapting the interpretation of the general words of the statute
to "industrial reality" with all of its variety of contract draftsmanship, or by
asking that "industrial reality" adapt itself, in its compensation arrangements,
to the simply stated and definitely understandable definition set forth in the
majority opinion. If exemptions are needed Congress should write them,
not the Court. It is clear that the prevention-of-long-hours and employment-.
spreading purposes of Congress will receive no necessary protection in indi-
vidual or collective agreements. The desire to secure work for additional hours
nlight lead to compromises on the 50% penalty. Apparently the Court felt that
it was important lo develop an approach which would be least likely of abuse
and most likely to effectuate the purposes of Congress in the enactment of
FLSA. The Court was required to lay down controlling principles drawn
from general language. It would have been basically unsound to have permitted
private parties, by contract, to control absolutely the legal effect of an arrange-
ment into which they have entered. If exceptions are needed, and it appears
that they are in certain instances, 63 Congress should be expected to provide
them. They should not, necessarily, control rules applicable to more normal
situations.
THE Belo-Halliburton EXCEPTION
In the Belo case 64 in 1942 there were individual written contracts
designating a regular rate of pay in cents per hour. This hourly rate was
1/60th of a former weekly salary, which remained the guaranteed weekly
minimum compensation the employee would receive regardless of the number
of hours worked. With time and one-half after 44 hours (then the weekly
maximum), his guaranty was the equivalent of pay for 5432 hours. After
that point additional hours were paid for at one and one-half times the
"regular rate" set in the contract. Employees worked irregular hours, in some
instances less than 40 in a workweek. It Is very obvious that, under such a
contract, although the employee receives the advantages of stability in income,
63. See infra p. 406.
64. Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624, 62 Sup. Ct. 1223, 86 L. Ed. 1716
(1942), supra note 15. See Feldman, Algebra and the Supreme Court, 40 ILL. L. REv. 489
(1946) ; Levy, Belo Revisited, 15 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 39 (1946).
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he receives no more compensation for 54Y2 hours than for 44. Conversely, the
labor costs of the employer are no more at all for working his employees
10Y2 hours in excess of the statutory maximum, much less 150% of what
they have been in the "maximum workweek" set by the statute. Nevertheless,
the arrangement was held valid, and the "regular rate" set by the individual
contracts was said to provide a proper basis for statutory excess compensation.
The fact that an "overtime" rate much in excess of 150% was paid for certain
hours was regarded as immaterial since Section 7(a) speaks of "not less
than one and one-half times the regular rate." If the Missel 35 formula
(announced simultaneously), of dividing hours worked into amount received
for a fluctuating workweek, had been required for the weeks when the
employee worked less than 54Y hours an entirely different "regular rate"
would have resulted. Resulting decisions in the lower courts showed confu-
sion as, to the scope of the doctrine announced by the case, and the inter-
relation of it with the Missel decision. 66
Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in the Helmerich & Payne,
Youngerman-Reynolds and Harnischfeger 67 cases were considered by many
lower courts to have virtually repudiated the Belo doctrine. Nevertheless in
the Halliburton case, in 1947, the Court reaffirmed it within the scope of a
comparable fact situation, possessing certain features which could have pro-
vided a basis of distinction if the Court had been so inclined. This case
also involved written individual contracts setting forth a "regular basic rate
of [a specified number of] cents per hour for the first 40 hours of any work-
week and not less than one and one-half times such basic hourly rate of pay
for all time over 40 hours in any workweek, with a guarantee that Employee
shall receive for regular time and for such overtime as the necessities of the
business may demand a sum not less than $ [a specified number] for each
workweek." 68 The rate was so related to the guarantee that additional
compensation would not be forthcoming unless the employee worked more
65. Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 62 Sup. Ct. 1216,
86 L. Ed. 1682 (1942), mupra note 25.
66. The "split-day plan" in Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U. S. 37, 65 Sup. Ct.
11, 89 L. Ed. 29 (1944), was upheld in the circuit court of appeals on the authority of the
Belo decision, 138 F. 2d 705 (C. C. A. 10th 1943). On the same authority the district
court upheld the contract designation of "overtime rates" in the Bay Ridge case, 69 F.
Supp. 956 (S. D. N. Y. 1947). Compare Shepler v. Crucible Fuel Co., 140 F. 2d 371
(C. C. A. 3d 1943); Murray v. Noblesville Milling Co., 131 F. 2d 470 (C. C. A. 7th
1942), cert. denied, 318 U, S. 775 (1943) ; Clay v. Motor Freight Express, Inc., 52 F.
Supp. 948 (E. D. Pa. 1943) ; Marvin v. Hodgson, 202 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1949) ; Watson v.
Hightower, 50 N. M. 322, 176 P. 2d 670 (1947) ; with Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151
F. 2d 311 (C. C. A. 3d 1945); Walling v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 151 F. 2d 381 (C. C. A.
7th 1945); McComb v. Sterling Ice Co., 165 F. 2d 265 (C. C. A. 10th 1947); Walling
v. Highway Express, Inc., 7 CCH LAB. CAs. 1 61568 (U. S. D. C. W. D. Tenn. 1943);
Walling v. Arctic Circle Exploration Inc., 56 F. Supp. 944 (W. D. Wash. 1944) ; Walling
v. Lippold, 72 F. Supp. 339 (D. Neb. 1947); Sevier v. Andersons, Inc., 15 CCH Lab.
Cas. 64582 (U. S. D. C. M. D. Tenn. 1948).
67. All supra note 14.
68. 331 U. S. 17, 19, 67 Sup. Ct. 1056, 91 L. Ed. 1312 (1947).
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than 84 hours in the workweek. Usually the employees worked less hours
than 84. In about 20% of the weeks the employees worked more than 84
hours; in other weeks their hours fell to less than 30. The Court first asserted
that the case was indistinguishable from the Belo case except in the amount
of the hourly rates and weekly guarantees. The 84-hour breaking-point was
said to be as closely related to the widely-fluctuating, actual workweek of
the employees in this case as was the 542 hour designation in Belo. In both
cases extra compensation was paid to employees for such excess hours at the
time and one-half rate as prescribed by contract. In both cases the full weekly
guarantee was paid even though hours fell to less than 40. There being no
substantial difference, the Court concluded that Belo must either be followed
or overruled.
The Court next considered whether Belo had been implicitly overruled by
the intervening decisions refusing to sanction designated "regular rates"
which were other than the "actual rate." In each of these cases, it was noted
that Belo was expressly distinguished and considered inapplicable. Further-
more, the Court said, in Belo the specified basic hourly rate was the "actual
regular rate" because (1) as to weeks in which more than 542 hours were
worked, the specified rate determined the amount of compensation actually
payable and (2) as to weeks in which less hours were worked, it could be
inferred from the collateral specification of a basic rate and provision for a
legal but variable rate of overtime pay, that the guaranteed flat sum then
due also contemplated both basic pay and overtime. The Court then proceeded
to demonstrate that the agreed method of wage computation in the three inter-
vening Supreme Court "regular rate" cases fitted neither of these requirements.
The Court, finally, refused to overrule Belo directly:
"The reasons . . .for rejecting this argument are equally valid today, and need
not be repeated. Moreover, our holding in Belo has been a rule of decision in this
Court for five years, and recognized as such on each appropriate occasion. Knowing
of the Belo decision, the Congress has permitted § 7(a) to stand unmodified and the
courts have applied it as so construed. Employers and employees (including those
involved in this case) have regulated their affairs on the faith of it. -Even if we
doubted the wisdom of the Belo decision as an original proposition we should not be
inclined to depart from it at this time." "
The Bay Ridge decision sums up the Halliburton decision as a reaffirm-
ance of Belo as a "narrow precedent principally because of public reliance
upon and congressional acceptance of the rule there announced." 70 There
remains the question of the scope of the "narrow precedent." Since the prob-
lem is created by the existence of the guaranty, it is rather pointless to say
that there must be such a guaranty. It seems to be clear that there is nothing
69. Id. at 25.
70. 334 U. S. 446, 462, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
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in FLSA to prevent reduction of wages and consequently of the actual "regular
rate." 71 The provision in Section 18 clearly does not effectuate any such
blanket prohibition. The Wage and Hour Administrator seems to agree that
wages can be reduced without FLSA violation.72 However, he asserts, the
regular rate of pay.may not be "manipulated" for the purpose of avoiding
the overtime requirements of the Act.73 "Manipulation" may involve a pur-
ported reduction while the total pay for the week remains the same, or a
temporary reduction in weeks where overtime is worked.
The Belo situation will necessarily involve a weekly or some other type
of guaranteed salary regardless of weekly hours. Obviously there must be
arrangement for and actual payment of time and one-half for hours in excess
of the breaking-point set in the written individual contracts. A flat weekly
guaranty covering straight time and overtime regardless of hours worked will
be handled by the Missel formula.7 4 It would seem that the "regular rate"
set in the contract must be a rate not a formula,7 5 although a dictum in the
Asselta7 6 case indicates the contrary possibility: Certainly the contract rate
must be treated by the parties as the "actual rate" and adjusted to reflect
changes in the guaranteed salary.7 7 Since the Halliburton decision the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in McComb v. Utica
Kzitting Co.75 has upheld a contract specifying an hourly "regular rate,"
with time and one-half of that rate for hours over 40, with a guaranteed
weekly salary covering straight and overtime compensation for 45 hours,
after which additional compensation at the time and one-half rate was paid.
The majority opinion stated that the weekly guaranty was not enough to
secure approval under the Belo doctrine, but there must be, in addition, "a
71. See Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624, 630 n. 6, 62 Sup. Ct. 1223, 86
L. Ed. 1716 (1942); accord: White v. Witwer Gro. Co., 132 F. 2d 108 (C. C. A. 8th
1942); General Mills, Inc. v. Williams, 132 F. 2d 367 (C. C. A. 6th 1942); Siegel v.
Blechman & Sons, Inc., 60 N. Y. S. 2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1946). Contra: Anuchick v.
Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 861 (E. D. Mich. 1942) ; cf. Walling v.
Belikoff, 59 F. Supp. 167 (S. D. N. Y. 1944), aff'd mer., 147 F. 2d 1008 (C. C. A. 2(1
1945).
72. See "Reduction of Wages," in WAGE & HOUR MANUAL 50:147 (B. N. A. 1949);
cf. Wage & Hour Administrator's Interp. Bull. No. 4, 1111 15, 26 (1940), also in WAG.
& HOUR MANUAL 50:9.
73. Wage & Hour Administrator's Interp. Bull. No. 4, 111 15, 16, 17 (1940), supra
note 72; Walling v. Green Head Bit and Supply Co., 138 F. 2d 453 (C. C. A. 10th
1943); cf. Walling v. Belikoff, 59 F. Supp. 167 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); Murray v. Nobles-
ville Milling Co., 42 F. Supp. 808 (S. D. Ind. 1942), 131 F. 2d 470 (C. C. A. 7th 1942);
cert. denied, 318 U. S. 775 (1943).
74. See Peffer v. Federal Cartridge Co., 63 F. Supp. 291 (W. D. Minn. 1945);
Sawyer v. Selig Mfg. Co., 74 F. Supp. 319 (D. Mass. 1947); White v. Modern
Methods, Inc., 15 CCH LAB. CAs. 1164653 (U. S. D. C. N. D. Ga. 1948).
75. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F. 2d 311 (C. C. A. 3d 1945), cert. denied,
327 U. S. 777 (1946).
76. 331 U. S. 199, 204, 67 Sup. Ct. 1178, 91 L. Ed. 1432 (1947).
77. McComb v. Sterling Ice & Coal Storage, 165 F. 2d 265 (C. C. A. 10th 1947);
Walling v. Highway Express, Inc., 7 CCH LAB. CAs. 11 61568 (U. S. D. C. W. D.
Tenn. 1943).
78. 164 F. 2d 670 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
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condition of irregularity" in the workweek or such uncertainty of work being
performed that the guaranty provides stability of employment and income
otherwise absent.7 9 It was added that the guaranty must be "fair in the circum-
stances." These conditions were held to be satisfied in this instance although
it appears from the dissent, in the denial of a petition for rehearing,8 0 that
less than 2% of the workweeks fell to less than 40 hours, instead of 20%
as first asserted by the majority.
OVERTIME PREMIUMrS
The- very vital significance of "overtime premiums" under FLSA has
already been suggested. Under the Supreme Court's definition of "regular
rate of pay" such premiums are deducted from total compensation received
before dividing by the number of hours worked in the week to ascertain the
"regular rate." Of equal significance is the fact that such premiums, having
been paid for the same purposes as the FLSA requirements, may be offset
against any liability for overtime pay under the Act. In defining "overtime
premium," it will be recalled the Bay Ridge majority opinion emphasized that
it was extra pay because of previous work for a specified number of hours,
whether by statute or contract, in the workweek or workday. Premiums or
penalties for any other purpose for work performed must be included in total
compensation for "regular rate" determination, and no credit may be taken for
such payments against liability for excess statutory compensation.8 ' Consid-
eration will be given to specific premium arrangements fitting the Court's
requirements. Other premium arrangements will be treated in a subsequent
section.
Premium for Hours Worked in Excess of a Specified Number in a Day.-
Many collective bargaining agreements contain provisions for time and one-
half for hours worked in excess of eight in a day. A similar requirement may
be prescribed by statute-the Walsh-IHealey Public Contracts Act,82 for
example. These are the clearest examples of overtime premiums, fitting the
Bay Ridge definition. The extra pay is for work because of previous work
for a specified number of hours in the workday. It is therefore deductible before
figuring the "regular rate" and may be offset against overtime compensation
required to be paid by FLSA. For employees normally working daily schedules
of seven, ten, or twelve hours identical treatment would be accorded with
respect to extra compensation, pursuant to a contract requiring time and one-
half for hours worked in excess of the prescribed daily touir. If instead of a
50% premium, the agreement called for 25%, 100%, or some other figure, for
79. Id. at 673.
80. Id. at 678.
81. 334 U. S. 446, 465-466, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
82. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. A. §§ 35-45 (1943).
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hours worked in excess of the normal daily schedule, the result would be
the same.
The Bay Ridge case in its definition of overtime premium makes no
reference to its relationship to the normal or regular workday. As stated, the
question is whether the extra pay is "because of previous work for a specified
number of hours." Would it be possible then to provide for time and one-half
rate to be paid for work done after four, six or seven hours in a regular
eight-hour day, and make use, for FLSA purposes, of the extra pay for the
last four, two or one hours of the day as an overtime premium? This is, of
course, the split-day plan rejected by the Court in Walling v. Helmnerich &
Payne.83 The Court recognized a possible misunderstanding in this connection
and asserted that its holding in Helierich & Payne was not contrary to the
position taken in the Bay Ridge case.84 The facts of the former case "indicated
a palpable evasion of the statutory purposes," the Court said. Would it make
any difference that a contract specified a regular working day of six hours
with time and one-half for hours in excess of six, while the normal daily
tour of duty actually amounted to eight hours? 85 It is considered that under
these circumstances, the Court would not adhere to its literal statement in
Bay Ridge about the "standard fixed by contract for the day or week," but
would revert to the Hehnerich & Payne approach. The Administrator states
that the specified number of hours must be pursuant to a bona fide standard.89
A United States District Court decision, entered since the Bay Ridge opinion,
phrases the "overtime premium" definition as "excess compensation, paid for
work ... in excess of regular hours in any one day." 87 It bears repeating that
the question in every case is on an individual basis. To qualify as an overtime
premium the pay must be for work by the individual over and above previous
work performed by him for a specified number of hours in the day or week
pursuant to a bona fide standard.
Premium for Hours Worked in Excess of a Specified Number in a
Week.-'Much that has been written in the previous section is obviously
adaptable under this heading. Contract provisions identical with FLSA
requirements br calling for time and one-half for hours worked in excess of
36 hours in a week, for example, are clear examples of overtime premiums
under the Supreme Court's definition in the Bay Ridge case. Premium pay
pursuant to contract for the sixth or seventh consecutive day of work in the
83. Supra note 14.
84. 334 U. S. 446, 466 n. 22, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
85. Walling v. Alaska Pacific Consolidated Mining Co., 152 F. 2d. 812 (C. C. A. 9th
1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 803 (1946) ; Robertson v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co.,
157 F. 2d 876 (C. C. A. 9th 1946), cert. denied (on this point), 331 U. S. 823 (1947);
cf. Walling v. Arctic Circle Exploration, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 944 (W. D. Wash. 1944).
86. Statement issued by Wage & Hour Administrator, Aug. 6, 1948, § 778.2, also
in WAGE & HOUR MANUAL 50:647, 648 (B. N. A. 1949).




workweek would probably qualify as overtime premium although not literally
within the Court's statement. The Wage and Hour Administrator has so
indicated.88 Premium pay for work on Saturday and Sunday may or may
not be sufficient to meet the test, depending upon. the wording of the agree-
ment and the actual practice controlling such payments. Such premiums were
involved in the Bay Ridge situation and the Court held in that case that they
must be included in total compensation rather than deducted in arriving at
the "regular rate." 89 The reason, of course, was that the premium for
Saturday afternoon and Sunday work was for work at undesirable hours and
in no way related to the fact that the individual employee had worked previ-
ously a specified number of hours.
The specified workweek and the actual practice at a particular estab-
lishment may be such that Monday through Friday covers a normal weekly
tour for all employees and work on Saturday and Sunday (with a specified
premium) represents, in virtually every instance, work by the individual in
excess of the standard weekly hours. It is possible by contract to provide
specifically that a particular employee will receive the specified Saturday and
Sunday premium only in the event of having previously worked a certain
number of hours or days. The contract can be worded, then, so as to take
full advantage of the Bay Ridge definition. In the absence of specific treatment,
under the above factual situation, the Administrator has stated that actual
practice will be examined as well as the* wording of agreements.90 If the
practice shows that the Saturday and Sunday premiums are contingent upon
individuals having previously "worked specified hours or days, then they
may be treated as overtime premiums, in the Administrator's opinion. Before
the Bay Ridge decision the Administrator's opinion had been that premiums
for work performed on Saturdays and Sundays (and holidays) "outside the
normal or regular working hours' were to be excluded in determining the
"regular rate" and credited toward overtime compensation requirements
under FLSA.01
ELEMENTS OF "TOTAL COMPENSATION"
As has been stated, the regular rate of pay of an employee is arrived
at by dividing his total compensation during any workweek by the total
number of hours worked after deducting any overtime premiums received
by him. The Supreme Court's definition being mutually exclusive in its terms,
88. See reference, note 86 supra.
89. 334 U. S. 446, 451 n. 5, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
90. See Statement issued by Wage & Hour Administrator, Aug. 6, 1948, § 778.2,
also in WAGE & HOUR MANUAL 50:649 (B. N. A. 1949); 6 CCH LAB. LAW REP.
ff 29012 (1948).
91. W. & H. Admr's Interp. Bull. No. 4, 1111 69, 70 (1940); see WAGE & HouR
MANUAL 50:22-26 (B. N. A. 1949), particularly "editor's note," 50:25. .
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premiums, penalties or any other payments which do not qualify as overtime
premiums but which are nonetheless "for hours worked" during the work-
week must enter into the total compensation figure.
Shift Differentials and Premiums for Work at Non-Standard Hours.-
These were of paramount significance in the Bay Ridge facts. There was no
disagreement in that case about the principle of including, for "regular rate"
computation, the extra amounts designated and understood to be compen-
sation for work on less-popular shifts. The attempted distinction between the
small differential designed as compensation and the 50% differential designed
to be prohibitive was rejected by the majority opinion in Bay RidgeY2 It may
be taken that any extra payments, regardless of amount, given merely because
the hours worked are at an undesirable time, must be included in total
compensation.9 3 Premium-pay arrangements for work at hours other than
during the prescribed standard workday or outside of the employee's regular
shift involve the same problem and receive the same answer. If the night-
work premium or after-shift or before-shift premium is made contingent
upon having worked previously a prescribed number of hours in the workday
it would then be an overtime premium as discussed above.9 4
Premiums for Work on Designated Days of the Week and Holidays.-
Saturday and Sunday work premiums have already been discussed. Together
with premiums for work on holidays they were dealt with directly in the
Bay Ridge decision. It is clear that if the premium is for work on these days
as such, and unrelated to previous work for a prescribed number of days or
hours pursuant to a bona fide standard, the extra pay must be included in
total compensation.9 5 This approach threatens the survival of such provisions
in union contracts and would inevitably make it more difficult for unions to
secure such provisions where they do not now exist. It appears likely that
Congress will adopt the suggestion of the Administrator that these premiums,
where the work is performed outside of normal or regular working hours, may
be treated as overtime premiums and excluded from "regular rate" compu-
tation.9 6 Premium pay for work performed on a holiday is normally unrelated
(and frequently unrelatable) to any previous number of hours worked in the
92. 334 U. S. 446, 469, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
93. Cabunac v. National Terminals Corp., 139 F. 2d. 853 (C. C. A. 7th 1944);
Walling v. Schollhorn Co., 54 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Conn. 1944); Ferrer v. Waterman
S. S. Corp., 70 F. Supp. 1 (D. Puerto Rico 1947).
94. It has been suggested that, under an employment contract calling for time and
one-half for hours worked in excess of eight daily and for time and one-half for hours
worked before 8 A.M. or after 5 P.M., an arrangement of a normal 24-hour workday
beginning at 8 A.M., would permit treating extra payments for "before-8" and "after-S"
work for those working the regular shift as overtime premiums pursuant to the Bay
Ridge definition. See 3 CCH LAB. LAw REP. 1 29,044 (1949).
L 95. 334 U. S. 446, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186; cf. Barker v. Ga. Power & Light Co., 5 CCH
LAB. CAs. 1 61,095 (M. D. Ga. 1942).
96. See infra, p. 406.
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week. It could be made so, of course, by specific contract provision. There
seems little likelihood, however, of contract adjustment to minimize materially
this feature in the way that is feasible in the case of Saturday and Sunday
premiums. Furthermore, it should not be assumed that there would be any
valid method of arranging, for those working on holidays, a "flexible rate"
for workweeks including holidays, so as to permit total compensation to
remain the same as if the holiday premium were not to be counted in "regular
rate" computations."
Premiumns for Unpleasant and Dangerous Work.-These, too, were dealt
with directly in the Bay Ridge case. Payments so received must be included
in total compensation for purposes of "regular rate" computation.
98
Bontses.99-The varieties of extra compensation to which the term
"bonus" is or might be applied are many. Any of the types of premium
payment already discussed, for example, will be called "bonuses" somewhere
in the American industrial scene. The extra compensation may be geared
to the production or efficiency of the individual employee or a group of
employees and made payable on the units produced, generally, or per dajr,
per week or some other interval. 10 0 Completion of tasks (on an individual or
group basis) ahead of the "standard performance time" may yield a "bonus."'' 1
It is obvious that many such "incentive bonus" plans are not provisions for
extra compensation in any realistic sense. Such payments are frequently the
only wages which are expected to be received normally by the individual
employee competent to perform his job. The Supreme Court decisions in the
Youngerman-Reynolds and Harnischfeger cases made clear that actual pay-
ments received under such plans must enter into the "regular rate." In addi-
tion to these incentive bonuses which are closely and intimately related to
the quality and quantity of work performed, one may find a great variety
of weekly, monthly, quarterly,, and yearly additional payments, from funds
established as a percentage of profits,102 or labor costs,' 0 3 or volume of
97. See opinion letter, 3 CCH LAB. Lxw REP. f[ 29,036 (1948).
98. 334 U. S. 446, 469, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
99.:See, in general, Note, Profit-Sharing Bonuses as Part of the Overtime Base
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 56 YALE L. J. 1429 (1947).
100. Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U. S. 419, 65 Sup. Ct.
1242, 89 L. Ed. 1705 (1945) ; U. S. v. Rosenwasser, 323 U. S. 360, 65 Sup. Ct. 295, 89 L.
Ed. 301 (1945); Walling v. Stone, 131 F. 2d 461 (C. C. A. 7th 1942).
101. Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U. S. 427, 65 Sup. Ct. 1246, 89 L. Ed.
1711 (1945) ; McComb v. La Casa del Transporte, Inc., 167 F. 2d 209 (C. C. A. 1st 1948);
Burke v. Mesta Machine Co., 15 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 64,673 (U. S. D. C. W. D. Pa. 1948);
Selan v. Becker, 71 F. Supp. 689 (E. D. Wisc. 1947).
102. Walling v. Wall Wire Products Co., 161 F. 2d 470 (C. C. A. 6th 1947);
Stomkin v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 14 CCH LAB. CAs. 1 64,300 (U. S.
D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1948) ; see Simons, Economic and Legal Aspects of Profit-Sharing,
2 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 76, 88 (1948).
103. De Waters v. Macklin Co., 167 F. 2d 694 (C. C. A. 6th 1948) ; Burke v. Mesta
Machine Co., 15 CCH LAB. CAs. ff 64,673 (U. S. D. C. W. D. Pa. 1948).
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production, 0 4 or bearing some relationship to dividends, 10 5 or simply chosen
as an arbitrary amount. Payments may be made to individuals on the basis
of straight-time 106 or total earnings, 10 7 base rates, 08 length of service,10°
attendance," 0 or some arbitrary plan of selection. Under what circumstances
will these payments be included in the total compensation used in computing
the regular rate of pay for FLSA purposes?
It may be observed that if payments designated as "bonuses" are free,
as such, from inclusion in the "regular rate" computation it would permit an
employer to minimize the penalizing effect of the 50% increase in labor
costs for working employees in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. In its
least subtle form this is illustrated by an arrangement to reduce an employee's
hourly wage to the statutory minimum, with the agreement that he will be
paid one and one-half the minimum for hours in excess of 40 in the week,
and will receive as a "weekly bonus" an amount sufficient to make his weekly
"take-home pay" equivalent to his former or a stated salary. It was early
held that such a bonus must be included in total compensation in computing
the regular rate of pay."' To the extent, though, that any bonus, however
computed or whenever paid, is regarded by the employee as an expected part
of his compensation, as deferred payment for work done, it is in substantially
the same position as an incentive to continued proficiency and stability as the
"weekly bonus" described. Yet it may be excluded from total compensation
if it can be regarded as "discretionary" on the employer's part. Furthermore,
the Administrator in an announced enforcement policy, since revoked, stated
that bonuses paid at greater intervals than quarterly would not be proceeded
against by his office." 2 As a practical matter the recalculation of "regular
rates of pay" in previous weeks because of a subsequent bonus payment imposes
a gigantic bookkeeping burden and undoubtedly deters the generous impulses
of some employers. If the possibility of abuse is controlled, it would be desir-
104. Walling v. Baush Machine Tool Co., 8 CCH LAB. CAs. f" 62,160 (U. S. D. C.
D. Mass. 1944).
105. Walling v. Garlock Packing Co., 159 F. 2d 44 (C. C. A. 2d 1947), cert. denied,
331 U. S. 820 (1947).
106. Walling v. Richmond Screv Anchor Co., 154 F. 2d 780 (C. C. A. 2d 1946),
cert. denied, 328 U. S. 870 (1946); Walling v. Adam Electric Co., 136 F. 2d 277 (C.
C. A., 8th 1947); McComb v. Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corp., 171 F. 2d 69
(C. C. A. 2d 1948).
107. De Waters v. Macklin Co., 167 F. 2d 694 (C. C. A. 6th 1948), cert. denied, 69
Sup. Ct. 48 (1948).
108. McComb v. Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corp., 171 F. 2d 69 (C. C. A. 2d
1948).
109. Ibid.
110. Bibb Mfg. Co., v. Walling, 164 F. 2d 179 (C. C. A. 5th 1947), cert. denied,
333 U. S. 836 (1948).
111. Carleton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming, 126 F. 2d 537 (C. C. A. 8th 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.'S. 634 (1942); Walling v. Fischer Lime & Cement Co., Inc., 8 CCH
LAB. CAs. ff 62,260 (U. S. D. C. W. D. Tenn. 1944).
112. Wage and Hour Division Release A-13 (Feb. 5, 1943), see "Editor's Note,"
WAGE & HOUR MANUAL 50:439 (B. N. A. 1948).
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able to exclude bonuses, such as semi-annual or annual profit-sharing arrange-
merts, from "regular rate" calculations." 3
The Supreme Court has not yet dealt directly with any of the more
troublesome types of bonus. The decisions which developed the definition of
"regular rate of pay," reviewed above, would indicate that the inclusion of
any extra payment in "total compensation" would depend upon whether the'
parties had agreed (in writing or orally, expressly or impliedly) upon it as
part of the payment for the work to be done." 4 Certainly the time when the
payment would be received would not be controlling as the Harnischfeger
case 115 shows. The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division follows
substantially this approach:
"Where it can be conclusively demonstrated that a particular payment is a gift
or gratuity it need not be included in computations of the regular rate of pay. In
this respect, it should be noted that, if the employee has a right by contract, express
or implied, to a payment, it cannot be considered a gift." 1'
Applying these principles to bonus payments, the Administrator has an-
nounced the following interpretations:
"DISCRETIONARY BONUS
"A. In bonus plans of the first category, the payment and the amount of the
bonus are solely in the discretion of the employer. The sum, if any, is determined by
him. The employee has no contract right, express or implied, to any amount. This
type of bonus is illustrated by the employer who pays his employees a share of the
profits of his business or a lump sum at Christmas time without having previously
promised, agreed or arranged to pay such bonus. In such case, the employer determines
that a, bonus is to be paid and also sets the amount to be paid.
"Bonus payments of this type will not be considered a part of the regular rate....
"AGREED BONUS
"B. In bonus plans of the second category the employer promises, agrees or
arranges to pay a bonus. The amount to be paid may be fixed or it may be ascertained
by the application of a formula.... Other kinds of bonuses [than direct incentives] falling
within this group are bonuses distributed in a certain amount or on the basis of a
fixed percentage of the profits of the employer or of his gross or net income ...
"Bonus payments of this type will be considered a part of the regular rate. . ." 1
113. See infra p. .
114. In the Bay Ridge decision see particularly 334 U. S. 446, 461, 68 Sup. Ct. 1186.
115. 325 U. S. 427, 432, 65 Sup. Ct. 1246, 89 L. Ed. 1711 (1945).
116. Opinion of Wage and Hour Administrator, R-1548 (Sep. 2, 1941), WAGE & HOUR
MANUAL 50:413 (B. N. A. 1949). When a discretionary year-end bonus was declared,
because of service in the preceding years, but made payable in regular installments dur-
ing the ensuing year if the individual remained in the employ of the company, it was
held that, although the sum of the bonus was not a part of the regular rate for the year
on which it was based, the regular payments became part of the regular rate of pay of the
employee as he received them during the ensuing year. Jacksonville Paper Co. v. McComb,
167 F. 2d 448 (C. C. A. 5th 1948); cf. McComb v. Paulson, 12 CCH LAB. CAs. ff 63,833
(U. S. D. C. N. D. Ill. 1947). A bonus which is a part of agreed compensation may not
be used to offset liability for excess compensation arising under FLSA; rather it must
be included in total compensation in computing regular rate of pay. But see Corey v.
Detroit Steel Corp., 52 F. Supp. 138 (E. D. Mich. 1943); cf. Roland Electric Co. v.
Black, 163 F. 2d 417 (C. C. A. 4th 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 854 (1948) ; Bender v..,
Crucible Steel Co., 71 F. Supp. 420 (W. D. Pa. 1947).
117. WAGE & HOUR MANUAL 50:413 (B. N. A. 1949).
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Pursuant to this interpretation the inclusion of the bonus payments in
regular rate computation will depend not upon the name given, or the source
or measure of the payments or the directness of the relationship of the pay-
ments to individual effort, but upon whether there is a contract right to receive
the bonus.118 Certain courts, however, have taken the word "arrange" in this
interpretation as providing a basis for inclusion of bonus payments, regularly
made, in the total compensation of the employee, regardless of the possibility
of enforcement of payment. In Wailing v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co.l19
the Second Circuit Cdurt of Appeals held that a reserved power in the em-
ployer's board of directors to cease previously-authorized monthly bonus pay-
ments, based on a percentage of weekly base salaries, did not prevent the bonus
payments from being included in the regular rate. The court said that, even
though there was no legal obligation to pay the bonuses, they were in fact paid
regularly and because of such "arrangement" for payment the amounts must
be included in total compensation. In this case and in Walling v. Garlock Pack-
ing Co., 120 decided by the same court in 1947, it is noted that the alleged dis-
cretionary bonus payments are treated as compensation to employees by the
employers for purposes of tax and other laws.
The Garlock Packing case also involved a reserved power to withdraw
or amend a quarterly bonus plan which depended for its operation on the
declaration of a dividend to the corporation's shareholders. It is emphasized
by the court that the employees were informed of the plan and looked forward
to receiving the bonus, which the employer bad, in fact, arranged to grant with
regularity. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court in both cases.
12 1 It
may be observed that in both instances machinery was established which would
virtually make certain the amount of the bonus automatically, unless action
was taken to stop it, and such action was not taken. In its latest decision the
Second Circuit Court has said expressly that there is no difference in operation
between an announced plan with a reservation to stop and regular payment
over a period of time of quarterly "prosperity bonuses," without an announced
plan, thus inducing the expectation of continuance. 122 It is believed that all
these cases might well be considered to fall within an implied contract pattern,
where no right would exist to force continuation of the bonus but there would
be contractual rights to payments allocable to the period already worked by the
employee. These rights arise by his continuing to work at the establishment
under circumstances where he has been led to believe, reasonably, that he will
118. Walling v. Wall Wire Products Co., 161 F. 2d 470 (C. C. A. 6th 1947),
cert. denied, 331 U. S. 828 (1947).
119. 154 F. 2d 780 (C. C. A. 2d 1946), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 870 (1946).
120. 159 F. 2d 44 (C. C. A. 2d 1947), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 820 (1947).
121. Supra notes 119 and 120.
122. McComb v. Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corp., 171 F. 2d 69 (C. C. A. 2d
1948). The Supreme Court has been requested to review this decision, 23 LAB, REL. REi,.
1949 WH 1626 (Mar. 7, 1949).
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receive the bonus. In any event, that specific point would not have to be de-
termined if the arrangement is the only requirement and the payments are in
fact made. It is believed, however, that the language of these Second Circuit
opinions goes beyond the Administrator's interpretation set forth above as well
as the principles thus far enunciated by the Supreme Court. Even completely
discretionary bonuses must be to some extent "arranged." The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Walling v. Adam Electric Co.12 3 refused to compel the
inclusion in the regular rate of certain bonuses declared quarterly from 1942
to 1945 on the ground that there was "no contract, promise, agreement or ar-
rangement to pay them in advance of the work period for which they were
later declared."
In arranging profit-sharing bonuses it may be noted that there is one very
simple method of avoiding any difficulties concerning regular rate of pay un-
der FLSA. If the monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual bonus is paid to
a particular employee in terms of a percentage increase of his total earnings
then, to the extent that he has worked hours in excess of the statutory maximum,
his bonus will take that into account. For example, if a quarterly "profit-shar-
ing" bonus is to be paid in varying amounts depending upon length of service,
and a particular employee is to receive a bonus equal to 10% of his earnings for
the quarter, then his straight time earnings and his overtime earnings, if any,
are both increased by 10%. This satisfies the requirements of the Act; to hold
otherwise is to require "overtime on overtime." 124
Board, Lodging, and Other Facilities.-Section 3(m) of the FLSA de-
fines "wage" to include the reasonable cost, as determined by the Administra-
tor, to the employer of furnishing an employee with board, lodging or other
facilities where such are customarily furnished. The reasonable cost, so de-
termined, would thus be part. of the total compensation of the employee for
computing the regular rate of pay.'
25
Insurance, Health and Welfare Plans, and Pension Plans.-It has been
stated by the Wage and Hour Division that if certain conditions are met, there
need not be reflected in regular rate-of-pay computations the aiount of any
payment by an employer on behalf of his employees generally or for a class-or
classes of his employees on account of the following types of plans:
123. 163 F. 2d 277 (C. C. A. 8th 19,47).
124. De Waters v. Macklin Co., 167 F. 2d 694 (C. C. A. 6th 1948); Stomkin v.
Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 14 CCH LAB. CAS. ff 64,300 (U. S. D. C. E. D.
N. Y. 1948); see Wage & Hour Division Opinion Letter (Aug. 16, 1947), WAGE &
HOUR MANUAL 50:469, 470 (B. N. A. 1949).
125. Southern Pacific Co. v. Joint Council Dining Car Employees, 13 CCH LAB.
CAs. ff 64,175 (C. C. A. 9th 1947). In some instances employees work for tips and do
not receive any formal compensation. It was held in Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 315 U. S. 386, 62 Sup. Ct. 659, 86 L. Ed. 914 (1942), that the tips are wages for the
purpose of compliance with FLSA. In Gaffney v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 170 F. 2d
302 (C. C. A. 4th 1948) the court rejected the claim of shoeshine boys employed in an
interstate bus terminal for overtime compensation based on tips earned on the ground
that no regular rate of pay for such purpose existed.
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"1. Retirement, annuity or pension plans.
2. Sickness or accident disability plans.
3. Medical and hospitalization plans.
4. Death benefit plans."1
The conditions which must be met are:
"(1) The employee must not have the option to receive instead of the benefits
under the plan any part of the contributions of the employer and (2) the employee
must not have the right to assign the benefits or to receive a cash consideration in lieu
of the benefits either upon termination of the plan or his withdrawal from it voluntarily
or through severance of employment with the particular employer." 12T
The administrative view seems to be that since such payments can provide
benefits to the employee only when he is not working that they are analogous
to compensation for hours not worked. This may be a convenient, though
definitely unrealistic, rationalization for what would be universally recognized
as a necessary result.
Under the conditions set forth in the above ruling, if the employer makes
contributions toward purchase of life insurance policies which become the prop-
erty of the employees and which policies have or can acquire cash and other
values capable of being realized immediately, then the contributions amount to
bonuses and are to be treated by the rules for such payments.128
Pay for Time Not Worked (Holidays, Vacations, Sick Leave, Voting
Time and Reporting Time).-Pay for holidays, vacations and other absences
has never been regarded as within the regular rate problem.120 Such payments
are not included in total compensation nor may they be used to offset claims
for statutory excess compensation. 130 The Bay Ridge definition speaks of
"total compensation for hours worked." This should not be understood
though as permitting an artificial "on-call" arrangement for an exceedingly
long number of hours during the week to obscure the fact that actually a much
shorter fluctuating workweek existed, which should be the basis of regular rate
computation. 131
"Reporting time" is proyided in a union contract calling for payment for
a minimum number of hours of work when an employee is permitted or or-
dered to report for work and less than the guaranteed number of hours is
available. Two to four hours pay to the employee under such circumstances is
frequently provided. To the extent that it is pay for time not worked, it is not
126. Wage & Hour Division Release, R-1743, WAGE & HoUR MANUAL 50:519
(B. N. A. 1949).
127. Ibid.
128. See WAGE & HoUR MANUAL 50:539 (B. N. A. 1949); cf. United Garment
Workers v. Jacob Reed's Sons, 16 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 64,927 (U. S. D. C. E. D. Pa. 1949)
(loans to employees from retirement trust funds).
129. See WAGE & HoUR MANUAL 50:559 (B. N. A. 1949).
130. Palmer v. Howard, 12 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 63,756 (U. S. D. C. W. D. Tenn. 1946);
Hutchinson v. Barry, 50 F. Supp. 292 (D. Mass. 1943).
131. Walling v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 151 F. 2d 381 (C. C. A. 7th 1945).
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included in the regular rate, nor do the hours which the payment represents
count as hours worked for FLSA purposes.132 This is quite different from
what is sometimes referred tQ as "call-in" pay, where, if an employee is called
in to work at night, outside of his regular shift, for example, he is guaranteed
pay for a certain number of hours. Although formerly classed as an overtime
premium because for work outside of the regular or normal hours, it is now
declared by the Administrator to be like a lump-sum bonus for work at a dis-
agreeable time and hence to be included in "total compensation." 133 Another
guaranteed payment may result when an employee cannot perform his regular
duties because the machinery is broken or the power is off. If the employee is
dismissed, any pay for a period after the dismissal would be for time not
worked. If he is required to remain on the premises and paid a guaranteed
"down-time" rate, then he is ,considered to be working and the payment is
treated like any other compensation for hours worked. Pay for rest periods
and lunch periods where the employee is not free to do entirely as he pleases
would be treated similarly.'
3 4
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Proposals for changes in the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
affecting overtime computation have been frequently offered, and many of
these have been incorporated in bills iiitroduced in the two houses of Con-
gress.135 Extensive hearings on the subject have been held during the last
three years, 136 and are continuing as this is being written. Suggestions to Con-
gress have ranged from those calling for complete elimination of Section 7 (a)
or a requirement of, no more than time and one-half on the minimum rate, on
through proposals eliminating certain bonuses or premium payments from the
regular rate, to the retention of the present section without change in any re-
spect. Senator Ball introduced a bill (S. 2386) in the 80th Congress which
contained five pages devoted to the definition of "regular rate of pay." This
bill would have written the Belo doctrine into the statute and would have
granted very full freedom under collective bargaining for the exclusion of a
great variety of payments from "regular rate" calculations.
The 81st Congress has produced no program quite so ambitious, but there
are proposals which would seek to change in varying degrees the situation re-
132. See Wage & Hour Administrator, Opinion Letter (Feb. 1, 1949), 3 CCH LAB.
LAw REP. 11 29,049 (1949).
133. Ibid.
134. See administrative opinions referred to in 3 CCH LAB. LAw RE. ff 25,335.22,
.23, .42 and .45 (1948); cf. Fox v. Summit King Mines, Ltd., 143 F.,2d 926 (C. C. A.
9th 1944).
135. See summary of proposals and pending legislation in Hearings before Sub-
committee No. 4 of the Committee on Education and Labor, on Proposed Amendmnents
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, H. R., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. Vol. 4, -p. 2609
(1947).
136. See, e.g., Hearings cited supra note 135, vols. 1-4.
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sulting from the Supreme Court's decision in the Bay Ridge case. 137 The scope
of the pending suggestions may be best indicated by setting forth the pro-
visions of H. R. 858, which has been passed by the House. It is limited to
the longshore, stevedoring, building and construction industries, but Senator
Wiley's bill (S. 252) would make similar provisions generaly applicable.' 38
H. R. 858 would add the following as subsection (e) of Section 7 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act:
"(e) For the purpose of computing overtime compensation payable under this
section to an employee employed in the longshore, stevedoring, building and con-
struction industries-
(1) who is paid for work on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, or on the sixth
or seventh day of the workweek, at a premium rate not less than one and one-half
times the rate established in good faith for like work performed in non-overtime
hours on other days, or
(2) who, in pursuance of an applicable employment contract or collective
bargaining agreement, is paid for work outside of the hours established in good
faith by the contract or agreement as the basic, normal, or regular workday (not
exceeding eight hours) or workweek (not exceeding forty hours), at a premium
rate not less than one and one-half times the rate established in good faith by the
contract or agreement for like work performed during such workday or workweek,
the extra compensation provided .by such premium rate shall not be deemed part of
the regular rate at which the employee is employed and may be credited toward any
premium compensation due him under this section for overtime work." "'
It will be noted that this abandons the idea of compelling by law extra payment
for hours worked after 40 where the individual is receiving a premium rate
during his normal working hours. On the other hand such a statute, even if
it were made general, would not give a free hand to contract designations of
"regular rate" and "overtime premium."
In contrast with the provisions set forth above the suggested changes in
Section 7 contained in a draft submitted by the Wage and Hour Administrator
would affect the result in Bay Ridge only to the extent of excluding from the
"regular rate" the amounts paid as extra compensation for hours worked on
Saturday or Sunday or on a recognized holiday or on the sixth or seventh day
of the workweek, or for hours outside the employee's normal or regular work-
ing hours, provided the rate paid for such work is at least 50% in excess of
the bona fide rate applicable to the same work performed at other times.' 40
Other changes proposed in regular rate computation by the Administrator
include the suggested codification of existing interpretations as to gifts, dis-
cretionary bonuses and pay for time not worked. Profit-sharing bonuses "meet-
ing requirements to be determined by the Administrator" would be excluded
137. See summaries of bills introduced in the 81st Congress, 23 LAn. REL. REP. 1949
WH 1550 (Jan. 17, 1949).
138. 23 LAB. REL. REP., 1949 WH 1535, 1536 (Jan. 17, 1949).
139. As appearing in CCH LAB. LAw REP., "Weekly Summary," Feb. 24, 1949, p. 2.
140. See 23 LAB. REL. REP., 1949 WH 1542, 1543 (Jan. 17, 1949); cf. 3 CCH LAI.
LAw REP. f[ 29,009 (1948).
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from the regular rate, as well as certain payments for employee benefit plans. 141
There are two other pending proposals for FLSA changes by the Adminis-
trator which bear upon the subject under discussion in a less direct fashion.
One has to do with making more flexible the exemption from the usual over-
time provisions of the Act provided by Section 7(b) (2) for annual employ-
ment plans. By encouraging greater use of the exemption, its enactment would
seek to provide the opportunity for less concern for the usual "regular rate"
problems. 14 2 Another very pertinent suggestion of the Administrator goes to
the relationship of his office to the application and interpretation of the law.
He suggests that the Administrator be granted adequate rule-making power
comparable to that provided under certain other federal laws. This would per-
mit his office to make issue, amend and rescind such regulations and orders
as are necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Act.
1 43
Under the situation now obtaining, the Portal-to-Portal Act 144 has the
effect of making interpretations of the Wage and Hour Administrator binding
only in providing a defense to employers against alleged liability under the
FLSA. In other words, what the Administrator says may be used to avoid
liability, but has no legal effect, in most respects, in imposing liability. Apart
from the matter of balance, however, there is a very practical problem in the
administration of the Act which should be definitely improved by the granting
of rule-making power to the Administrator. There has been a tremendous
volume of FLSA litigation during the last ten years but there are still many
terms in the Act and many possible applications of the Act that have not re-
ceived judicial consideration by the Supreme Court. As presently administered
the meaning of most of the terms in the statute is a matter for court interpreta-
tion alone, unaided, in a legal sense, by any administrative agency. It is believed
that the uncertainties of the statute yet remaining, or those inhering in such
amendments as might be adopted, could be minimized by providing the Ad-
ministrator with the power to make ruleshaving the force and effect of law,
subject of course to the checks against administrative abuse provided by the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act. 14 5 It is quite evident that the Supreme
Court would welcome the assistance that -such administrative rule-making
power would provide in dealing with the wage and hour problem. In the Bay
Ridge decision the majority opinion states:
"As no authority was given any agency to establish regulations, courts must
apply the statute to this situation without the benefit of binding interpretations within
the scope of the Act by an administrative agency." ,
141. Ibid.
142. See Hearings, cited note 135, vol. 4, p. 2650.
143. 23 LAB. REL. REP., 1949 WH 1546 (Jan. 17, 1949).
144. 61 STAT. 84 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 258 (Supp. 1948).
145. 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001-11 (Supp. 1948).
146. 334 U. S. 446, 461, 68 Sup. Ct 1186.
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This comes close to sounding like a call for help. Nothing is to be gained by
forcing the Court to define the terms of the Act on a case-by-case basis and to
apply these terms to the myriad possible industrial situations without adminis-
trative assistance. It is idle to speculate on what might have been, but certainly
there is reason to believe that both the portal-to-portal fiasco and the storm
now centering around "overtime on overtime" could have been largely pre-
vented or minimized through intelligent and legally-effective administrative
handling.147
147. For a more detailed study of possible legislative changes affecting overtime
pay, see Dabney and Dabney, Regular Rate and the Bay Ridge Case: A Guide to Legisla-
tive Revision, 58 YALE L. J. 353 (1949).
